Study objective: This study seeks to understand how emergency physicians decide to use observation services, and how placing a patient under observation influences physicians' subsequent decisionmaking.
INTRODUCTION Background
The last decade has seen a substantial increase in observation services-hospital-based ambulatory care used to evaluate and treat patients presenting at the emergency department (ED)-while a decision is made in regard to admission or discharge. 1 Although evidence from both England and the United States demonstrates that observation services can reduce unnecessary inpatient admissions, reduce inappropriate ED discharges, and improve diagnosis and treatment, 2, 3 analyses of claims or medical records contribute little to our understanding of how emergency physicians think. Consequently, little is known about how physicians decide to place patients under observation, or how this influences physicians' subsequent decisionmaking. As the use of observation services continues to increase, answering these questions is important. 1, 4 Emergency physicians now have more information and options to consider in their decisionmaking. Crudely, the process has moved from binary (admit/discharge) to ternary (admit/observe/discharge), with observation affording the opportunity to gather additional information. If physicians' initial decisionmaking processes lead them to incorrect decisions, they risk discharging patients prematurely, with obvious deleterious implications for patient safety, or observing or admitting patients unnecessarily, with implications for efficient resource use, patient experience, and potential iatrogenic harm. Similarly, observation's usefulness largely depends on the degree to which it facilitates better decisionmaking: whether the extra time and opportunities for diagnostic testing it affords are used effectively for the patients who stand to benefit most. 5 Although a few studies have examined emergency physician decisionmaking, we know of none examining decisionmaking in the context of observation services. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] Editor's Capsule Summary What is already known on this topic Emergency department patients are often transferred to observation status, but little is known about how emergency physicians make that decision or how that option affects emergency physician decisionmaking.
What question this study addressed
This qualitative study of 10 US and 14 UK emergency physicians explored how such decisions are made.
What this study adds to our knowledge Although observation status can be used beneficially to provide additional time to sort out a patient's condition, it can also be used sloppily as a way of avoiding making a decision.
How this is relevant to clinical practice
Better understanding of how physicians use observation can help shape policies that will maximize the utility of this process.
governing payment and care delivery-for example, the 4-hour maximum wait in the ED in England 12 and pressures to maximize hospital reimbursement peculiar to the United States 13 -we examine emergency physicians' decisionmaking in 2 differently structured national health care systems (England and the United States). We have previously described why we selected these 2 countries and the general role observation services plays in both. 14 We hypothesize that emergency physicians rely more heavily on intuitive thinking when deciding to place patients under observation. Conversely, we hypothesize that the extra time afforded by placing patients under observation may permit physicians to increase reliance on analytic thinking.
MATERIALS AND METHODS Study Design and Setting
We conducted detailed semistructured interviews with a convenience sample of 24 emergency physicians, including 10 from a large academic medical center in the US Midwest, and 14 from 2 large academic medical centers in central and northern England. We initially planned to sample 10 physicians at each site, but achieved thematic saturation earlier than expected because the interviewers jointly determined that no new themes had emerged during several subsequent interviews. We contacted physicians by e-mail or telephone, informed them about the study, and invited their participation. To ensure representation of various perspectives, we sought a mix of physicians by sex and practice experience. To encourage participation, interviewees received a $50 Amazon gift card.
Data Collection and Processing
Physicians agreeing to participate received a follow-up e-mail or telephone call to schedule an interview time. We conducted and digitally recorded all interviews in person. One interviewer was American and the other was English, and both conducted approximately half of the interviews in each country to balance any cultural biases that might otherwise occur in a cross-national study. Interviewers used a guide containing fixed-response and open-ended questions developed from the observation literature in consultation with our emergency physician coinvestigators (Appendix E1, available online at http://www. annemergmed.com). Questions specific to the decisionmaking process were guided conceptually by dualprocess theory. We allowed discussions to evolve naturally, not asking all questions in every instance, altering question order, and asking unscripted questions as appropriate to probe emerging topics of interest. Then we had the audio files professionally transcribed.
Primary Data Analysis
Initially, a trained research assistant read all transcripts to gain familiarity with the data, note any emerging themes, and ensure that respondents' remarks were accurately captured. Then she manually coded the interviews in Microsoft Word (version 16.0.4690.1000; Microsoft, Redmond, WA), beginning with codes derived from the interview guide and creating additional codes as suggested by the data, ensuring that unanticipated themes were incorporated into the analysis. Two coauthors from different disciplinary backgrounds conducted a nonblinded review of the coded transcripts to verify their accuracy and discussed coding discrepancies (which were minimal) until they reached consensus. Finally, we used axial coding to develop an integrative understanding of the connections between codes that explained our data and provided a conceptual framework for presenting our results. 15 We also shared results with clinical members of the research team and sought their feedback to ensure face validity. The study was approved by the University of Iowa institutional review board.
RESULTS

Characteristics of Study Subjects
Our sample of 24 emergency physicians consisted of 5 women and 19 men in full-time practice and covered a wide range of experience levels in both countries. The US physicians averaged 7.8 years' postresidency practice experience in emergency medicine (range 2 to 17 years). The UK physicians averaged 6.9 years of practice experience in emergency medicine at consultant grade (approximate equivalent of postresidency practice in the United Kingdom) (range 1 to 15 years). Although the use of care pathways was described in the UK medical centers, neither the UK nor US study sites had explicit inclusion or exclusion criteria for observation services use. In the US study site, the care of observation patients was assumed by hospitalists, whereas in the UK study sites, this care continued to be provided by the emergency physician.
Main Results
In accordance with the interview data, we present 3 overarching themes derived from axial coding, as summarized in the Figure. First, we explore the physician's initial decision to admit, observe, or discharge. In particular, we examine the trade-offs between the benefits of heuristics in resourceconstrained environments and the potential for cognitive biases. Next, we shift specifically to the rationales physicians invoked for observation services use. Participants described a mix of benefits (eg, additional time to gather clinical data and deliver protocol-driven care) and drawbacks (eg, use of observation to avoid admission and discharge decisions). Finally, we explore how a physician's decisionmaking may change once a patient is placed in observation. Although all respondents agreed that observation services permitted more time for decisionmaking, some saw that as an opportunity to think more systematically, whereas others warned that it could foster cognitive biases.
When a patient presents at the ED, the physician's primary task is risk stratification, which, according to respondents in both countries, begins with rapidly ruling out life-threatening conditions:
The first thing that we are always thinking is, Do they have one of 10 or 15 diagnoses that is going to kill them right now? (US 1)
In the ED, we're more focused on what's the worst thing it can be, and can I say it's not the worst thing? Or am I still worried about the worst thing? And you might do testing to prove it's not the worst thing. Figure.
The hierarchic organization of interview data into axial codes, major codes, and subcodes.
the serious diagnosis. I definitely don't want to miss and then work out ways of ruling them out.and then do those tests. (UK 1)
To get a more concrete sense of this initial decisionmaking process, we asked interviewees to walk us through their approach to handling patients, using 2 common presentations: chest pain and abdominal pain. In both cases, their responses underscored the use of risk stratification: In any event, this initial risk-stratification process happens quickly, and respondents indicated their ability to make very rapid decisions:
You can probably pick up within 30 seconds, 2 minutes, whether you think someone is going to need admission. (UK 2)
A skilled emergency physician probably knows whether the patient is going home or being admitted within about 2 to 5 minutes of walking into a room, looking at the patient, looking at their vital signs, taking a couple focused questions and examining them...
. (US 2)
[I]f you've been doing it for a while, you can 9 times out of 10 look at a patient and [in] the first 15 seconds know what that patient's ultimate disposition is going to be.
(US 3)
Although some referred to these rapid and seemingly intuitive decisions as "gut instinct," others described patterns arising from learned experience, in accordance with Klein's recognition-primed decision model. 16 As 2 respondents put it:
[O]ver time, you start to recognize a pattern.. Although pattern recognition and "gut instinct" are 2 ways of describing the same phenomenon, respondents also stressed the importance of the replicability of analytic thinking:
Being [an emergency] pediatrician for 15 years, I'd be foolish to say that gut instinct doesn't come into it.but.I can't be using the process purely on instinct because I can't train that in somebody who's only got 6 months' experience. It still has to be relatively guideline driven in terms of it doesn't matter who you see, that they're going to make a safe decision..
(UK 3)
Similarly, most participants noted the utility of evidence-based protocols in guiding them to an initial diagnosis while acknowledging the role of clinical judgment. As one participant put it, "patients are not going to come with guidelines in their presentation," so "there is always space for using common sense in between" (UK 4). Often, these decisions to ignore evidence-based guidelines seemed designed to err on the side of caution and were usually driven by respondents' own risk aversion and the influence of the "horror story":
You always have that sort of gut instinct.where you just feel something doesn't sound right or this doesn't look right to me and I'm going to overinvestigate you.because..something just says to me don't send this person home. (UK 5) [I]t just sort of gives you a sense in the pit of your stomach that this isn't one to take a risk on.. We always hear about the patients that you sent home that you shouldn't have. (US 4) [Y]ou might think, oh gosh, one of my mates once
(UK 6)
On conscious reflection, several participants indicated that a 5% to 10% risk of an adverse outcome would keep them from discharging a patient, although one respondent admitted that the true threshold is even lower:
You know, if we are really being honest, it's probably close to 2 or 1 [percent] . We all say 5 so we sound good. (US 1)
Setting aside patients obviously warranting admission or discharge, both UK and US physicians reported that observation services are indicated when there is a clear need to gather additional information or when the diagnosis and treatment plan are well established and time limited:
[P]utting them in the observation unit would give us time for the disease to present itself, essentially.. [For example,].we know.appendicitis.will get worse over the next 24 hours, so in that type of situation, observation is really quite good. (US 3)
Observation units for me are about time as a tool.. We just sometimes need longer with these patients to see which way their disease is progressing, and therefore we're stratifying them rather than just a very definitive very black-and-white decision of admission or home. It gives us a third way and it keeps patients safe. (UK 3) I think if you can't create a protocol for them.that means there is enough ambiguity and diagnosis questioning that they may not be ideal for obs [ 
ervation]. (US 5)
Those patients that need observation, normally.it's the sort of patient where you need to do an intervention of some description.. Once you've done that intervention or two, they're good to go home. (UK 2) I'm observing this patient specifically to look for this thing, and if I find it, I'll admit them. If I don't, I'll discharge them. (UK 6) However, many physicians in both England and the United States mentioned that observation services were sometimes used to postpone decisionmaking. If the physician is uncomfortable deciding to admit or discharge, he or she may place patients in observation by default:
[It is] sometimes cynically called the clinical indecision unit.because it's an easy option for [a ]junior doctor. You'd see a tricky patient. You're wondering. They look okay. I think I can send them home, but I've heard these horror stories about people dropping dead 2 days after they're sent home. I'll do some blood tests. I'll put them on the decision unit. By the time the blood tests come back, I'll have finished my shift, or maybe I'll be feeling more decisive. Something will happen. (UK 6) People who don't want to decide what to do with their patient, just want to hand them on to the next doctor, will put them down there. And sometimes that's a conscious thing, and more often it's probably not a conscious thing.. I would assume they're thinking.
[
t]ime and some investigations may help this. (UK 7)
Thus, observation not only offers an opportunity to gather additional information and improve decision quality but also represents a means of postponing decisionmaking, without a clear idea of how observation might improve decisions. Of course, postponing the ultimate decision about the patient's disposition is itself a decision. Thus, the availability of observation services does not necessarily result in further data collection to make decisions.
Beyond the decision to observe, it is equally important to understand whether and how physicians' decisionmaking changes once the contextual environment has been altered by placing the patient in observation. We expected that this would afford physicians additional time, enabling them to shift from intuitive to analytic thinking, but that was not always the case.
The observation unit was clearly considered a more comfortable, less stressful environment compared with the ED, which many saw as an opportunity to approach patients more systematically:
I'm not so time pressured to make a decision on them yet, so, yeah, it probably does slow things down perhaps. 
LIMITATIONS
Our study is subject to some limitations. Foremost among these is the difficulty in assessing physicians' cognitive decisionmaking processes through a retrospective interview format, which introduces the possibility of recall bias. It is notoriously difficult to explicitly ask questions about an inherently subconscious process such as intuitive reasoning. Related to this, participants often offered examples about how others practice, which may be even less accurate than one's own metacognitive processes. Although direct observation of physicians in practice or interviews occurring immediately after decisionmaking could reduce such bias, doing so is potentially resource intensive, raises issues of patient confidentiality, and is likewise subject to its own biases (eg, the Hawthorne effect). Another limitation is that our reliance on physicians at just 3 hospitals may limit the transferability of our findings to the extent that there is homogeneity of practice within a given setting. However, recent work has documented significant interphysician practice variation even within a single ED. 17 Still, despite including physicians with a range of practice experience, our convenience sample is admittedly skewed toward younger physicians. To the extent that physician decisionmaking changes with practice experience, this may have introduced maturation effects, and to the extent that the younger physicians trained in an era of clinical guidelines and protocols, whereas more seasoned physicians did not, this may have introduced cohort effects. However, both of these biases would be a greater concern in a quantitative study, whereas the goal of our qualitative analysis was to identify concepts and uncover diverse perspectives, which our sample certainly accomplished.
DISCUSSION
Emergency physician decisionmaking is an underrepresented area in the study of medical decisionmaking. In the ED, physicians must "assess patients with whom.[they are].unfamiliar, within narrow time frames, and.with limited resources." 18 Some think this increases reliance on intuitive thinking, exacerbates errors, and adversely affects patient outcomes, [19] [20] [21] [22] whereas others suggest that heuristics (in the form of experience-based pattern matching) may be used to arrive quickly at a "workable choice," with minimal analytic reasoning. 16, [23] [24] [25] [26] Proponents of analytic thinking argue that physicians should minimize intuitive thinking in favor of protocol-driven care, [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] whereas proponents of intuitive thinking argue that inadequate medical knowledge-not use of heuristics-causes diagnostic error, [32] [33] [34] and they encourage the development and use of "fast-and-frugal" decision trees. 34, 35 However, still others have questioned the very notion of distinct intuitive and analytic thought processes, instead proposing a single, highly adaptive, closed-loop, abductive, muddling thought process of expert decisionmaking. 36 To our knowledge, no previous work has examined this decisionmaking in the context of rapidly increasing observation services use. Before the advent of observation services, physicians faced a binary choice to admit or discharge patients. Now, there are 3 options. As we have previously discussed, both policy and patient socioeconomic factors can influence emergency physicians' decisions to use observation services.
14 Here, however, we focus exclusively on the cognitive aspects of clinical decisionmaking and observation services use in the ED. Our findings provide a better understanding of how the introduction of observation services has influenced physicians' decisionmaking, how physicians' decisionmaking has influenced use of observation services, and how intuitive and analytic thinking influences both of these processes.
The initial decision to admit, observe, or discharge a patient was overwhelmingly described as a process of risk stratifying patients. In contrast to our and others' expectations, [37] [38] [39] we did not find a linear, stepwise progression from a rapid intuitive differential diagnosis to a more considered analytic reappraisal, but rather a varying reliance on both modes. 40 Although emergency physicians express a preference for analytic reasoning in the abstract, 41 our findings suggest that a more pragmatic, mixed cognitive approach occurs within the resource-constrained environment of the ED.
Physicians essentially described using heuristics to make safe and timely decisions. Foremost among these were the "common thing" and "worst case" heuristics, the first representing a confirmatory search for the most likely explanation, given a patient's symptoms, and the second representing a ruling-out search for the least likely but most potentially harmful explanation for those same symptoms.
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By asking tailored questions and ordering certain tests, the emergency physician delineates diagnostic boundaries, quickly generates differential diagnoses, and determines whether to admit, observe, or discharge the patient.
Our respondents indicated that this process happens very quickly, often in as little as 15 seconds to 5 minutes, which is consistent with findings of previous research. 9, 42 Such rapid, heuristic-based decisions suggest intuitive thinking, but experienced individuals can make rapid decisions with analytic thinking by quickly working through the steps of a care protocol. Flach et al 36 argued that this is a single cognitive muddling process that simply feels more or less intuitive, depending on the ease of pattern recognition.
In the resource-constrained environment of the ED, physicians are going to-at least occasionally-make mistakes. If they err on the side of caution, the result is a false alarm. If they err in the other direction, they risk missing a serious condition. Using heuristics is an efficient way for emergency physicians to make decisions, but it is not without its limits. Although most respondents indicated that observation services exist to provide time-limited treatment before discharge, or specific further testing before the admission or discharge decision is made, respondents in both countries also acknowledged the use of observation services to mitigate fears of missing something important, even if such an outcome were highly improbable. As was found in recent work on emergency physician risk estimates and admission decisions, our respondents indicated that a 1% risk of an adverse outcome was sufficient to prevent them from discharging a patient. 43 Although this is unlikely to result in worse clinical outcomes, it may lead to inefficient use of health care resources, inconvenience for patients, ED crowding, and lower quality of care. Fortunately, respondents suggested that this tendency toward overreliance on observation services as a "safety net" diminishes with practice experience. Presumably, this is because physician pattern recognition improves and risk tolerance increases. Emergency physicians do not make decisions in isolation. EDs function as a team, the checks and balances of which can combat the limitations of heuristics. 36 Thus, more senior physicians may prevent their less experienced colleagues from using observation services less judiciously.
Respondents suggested that their subsequent decisionmaking could be differentially influenced by placing patients in observation. Although all respondents suggested that observation services are delivered in a more relaxed environment versus the ED, there was disagreement about whether the additional time was helpful or harmful to decisionmaking. Some respondents indicated that observation provides a greater opportunity for analytic thinking. This might occur through an iterative process; for example, a patient is placed in observation and receives a test, and the physician sees the test result, reevaluates the patient, and proceeds to discharge, admit, or order further indicated testing. However, other respondents argued that having extra time could backfire, allowing physicians to succumb further to the very thought processes responsible for the patient's initial placement in observation.
Overall, our findings suggest that emergency physicians use heuristics to make safe and timely decisions about admitting or discharging patients. Observation services are a tool that can facilitate or impede that process, depending on the physician's individual level of risk aversion and the policy incentives and clinical norms inherent to the health care system in which he or she practices. Less experienced or otherwise more risk-averse physicians may be inclined to use observation to postpone the ultimate decision of admission or discharge, and although the additional time observation affords is often beneficial to decisionmaking, it can also lead to unnecessary testing and extended stays in the hospital. Accordingly, we suggest 2 sets of interventions that might facilitate optimal evidence-based observation services use.
2,44-49 First, it seems sensible to establish clear criteria for placement in observation that focus on using observation to facilitate the admission-versus-discharge decision, rather than avoiding decisions under the guise of watchful waiting (recognizing that for some conditions such as head injury, watchful waiting is itself an appropriate protocol). Simultaneously, once a patient is placed under observation, he or she must be approached with defined endpoints in mind lest the extra time merely result in overinvestigation and delayed admission or discharge.
Second, we endorse the calls of others for more explicit consideration of the role of intuitive and analytic thinking. 20, 37 Physicians need to understand the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches and deliberately engage in metacognitive reflection on their practice patterns. Croskerry 20 suggested numerous interventions to improve the quality of intuitive thinking and prompt an appropriate resort to analytic thinking. Given that every decision to admit, observe, or discharge is ultimately a matter of physician judgment rather than presence or absence of options and protocols, such interventions would appear vital if the appropriate, delicate balance between patient safety, optimal outcome, and system efficiency is to be achieved.
